Hillary Mann Leverett to Argue that “The West Should Get Out of Bed with the House of Saud” in Upcoming BBC/Intelligence Squared Debate

On Thursday, May 28, at 6:45 in Cadogan Hall, London, Hillary will take part in an Intelligence Squared debate, “The West Should Get Out of Bed with the House of Saud”; the debate will subsequently be broadcast by BBC and posted as a podcast.  Hillary and Egyptian-American journalist Mona Eltahawy will argue for the motion; arguing against will be Jamie Rubin, former spokesman for Secretary of State Madeleine Albright during President Clinton’s second term, and Sir Alan Duncan, a Conservative MP and former Minister of State for International Development.  Readers in London can click on the link above for tickets.

Also, Hillary appeared last week on Press TV’s The Debate to discuss the ongoing nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1, see here.

Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett  

 

Obama Panders to GCC States Over a Prospective Nuclear Deal with Iran: Leverett and Marandi on CCTV’s The Heat

Hillary assessed the Obama administration’s exceptionally maladroit handling of President Obama’s “summit” with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC leader) at Camp David on CCTV’s The Heat last week, see here.  She noted that, while ostensibly called to “reassure” GCC elites, Obama’s gathering at Camp David failed utterly to address the concerns that some Gulf Arab rulers actually have:

“Although there is some language that the U.S. would potentially use force to protect our Gulf allies, it’s very carefully caveated, with this language:  that we would be prepared—prepared, not that we would, but we would be prepared—to potentially use force if their territorial integrity, according to the UN Charter, is threatened.  That means, first and foremost, a very loud signal to them that if there’s an uprising in your country and they want to change the government, the United States is not coming.  That’s a very pointed message.  We have the example of Bahrain, where there’s been a lot of unrest.  If the people of Bahrain decided to rise up and change the government, the United States isn’t going to be there.

This is just about this speculative concern that maybe Iran, somehow, would invade these [GCC] countries and we would protect them.  But that’s not their fear; their fear is from their internal populations.  They call these segments of their populations—which, in some case, have been restive; they’ve often been marginalized, especially among the Shi’a communities—the Gulf States have taken to calling them ‘foreign, Iranian-backed elements.’  But they are part of their populations; these are their domestic constituencies…

Their [GCC] concerns are [also] about rising Iranian power in the region.  I have never met an official or an analyst from a Gulf state—or from here, in the U.S. government in Washington—that thinks Iran is going to send its military into any one of these countries.  The Islamic Republic of Iran has never invaded another country, and has never even threatened to do so.

Their [GCC] concern is not that a nuclear-armed Iran is going to use nuclear weapons to annihilate them.  Their concern is that, the more money Iran could amass coming out from under sanctions, the more it will have economic power, and it will translate that into military power, which it could use to support—either militarily or just philosophically—these domestic constituencies in the Gulf states, to rise up against their governments or to constrain their governments from attacking Iran.  That’s their concern; it’s not about Iran acquiring some mythical nuclear weapon.”

Hillary explained that the refusal of the kings of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain to “even show up” at the meeting with President Obama was a particularly significant development:

“It was a very deliberate message, signal to the United States that Saudi Arabia may be going its own way.  Even more important, in some ways, than the Saudi king not coming—he said it was ostensibly because of developments in Yemen—was the probable Saudi instruction to the King of Bahrain, this small state where the U.S. Fifth Fleet is based, that the King of Bahrain not come here and instead go to London for a horse show with the Queen of England.  There could not be any greater insult…What it signifies is a profound shift, by the Saudis, away from the United States, and potentially for them even to deploy some of the elements of their power against the United States, in a way we’ve seen some precursors of before, but we’ve not really seen full force.”

Hillary goes on to elaborate some of the ways in which Saudi Arabia can deploy some of the elements of its power against the United States.

Of course, if the Obama administration really wanted to use a prospective nuclear deal with Iran to recast America’s Middle East strategy in more positive ways—including by recalibrating U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia—then GCC leaders’ unhappiness with the Camp David summit wouldn’t matter that much.  But the administration isn’t seeking to use an Iran nuclear agreement as the springboard for a comprehensive revision of America’s Middle East strategy.  In this regard, preemptively circumscribing the potential diplomatic impact of an Iran nuclear deal is the Obama administration’s most consequential—and foolish—way of pandering to GCC (and Israeli) concerns about nuclear diplomacy with Tehran.

Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes made this clear on the day GCC representatives met Obama at Camp David.  Speaking about a prospective nuclear deal with Iran, Rhodes presented the administration’s perspective in stark terms:

“It’s a transaction on the nuclear issue.  This is not a broader rapprochement between the United States and Iran on a range of issues; it is a very specific agreement that will deal with the Iranian nuclear program…We’ll still be just as concerned about Iran’s destabilizing activities, support for terrorism and proxies across the region.”

The episode of CCTV’s The Heat on which Hillary appeared also includes an important and in-depth discussion with our colleague, Seyed Mohammad Marandi of the University of Tehran’s Faculty of World Studies, see here and (for YouTube) here.


 

Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

 

Obama’s GCC “Summit” and the Deepening Incoherence of America’s Middle East Strategy

The Wire, a new and extremely promising Indian media venture edited by our colleague Siddharth Varadarajan (former editor of The Hindu), has just published our latest article, “Strategic Confusion and Obama’s Hapless Persian Gulf Diplomacy,” see here; we’ve also appended the text below.

Strategic Confusion and Obama’s Hapless Persian Gulf Diplomacy

Defying escalating rhetoric that Iran is “gobbling up the Middle East,” President Obama told the New York Times recently that “the biggest threat” to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states may not come from Iran, but “from dissatisfaction inside their own countries.”  Yet, displaying how deeply mired in Washington hype his administration remains, Obama has called on GCC leaders to parade with him at Camp David this week as if Iran is their biggest threat.

Saudi King Salman has refused to join in this spectacle, underscoring that, in foreign policy, friendship and interest should not be conflated.  Obama, by contrast, studiously overlooks this reality that, today, U.S. and Saudi interests on a number of key issues not only diverge, but conflict.  By refusing to deal with GCC states on the basis of interest, rather than friendship, Obama actually helps some of them continue pursuing policies deeply damaging to U.S. interests.

However much GCC elites evoke specters of Iranian “aggressiveness”—framed either in essentialist caricatures of “Persian expansionism” or depictions of the Islamic Republic’s allegedly radical Shi’a sectarianism—Iran is not the source of their insecurity.  In reality, GCC leaders have felt existentially threatened since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq upended a regional order based on Sunni Arab autocracies linked, in various ways, to Washington.

Saudis and the IS

With U.S. encouragement, Saudi Arabia and other GCC states had supported Iraq’s Saddam Hussein financially in the 1980s, as he pursued aggressive war (including extensive chemical weapons use) against Iran.  While Saddam eventually threatened GCC states, his overthrow in 2003 created major challenges for some of them, especially Saudi Arabia.  Riyadh could not endorse a more representative post-Saddam Iraqi polity that would, by definition, empower Shi’a, make Sunnis a permanent minority, and boost Iran’s influence.  So, the Saudis urged militant Sunni jihadis—of a sort they had long supported, some of whom had created and remained involved with al-Qa’idato go to Iraq and help Sunni tribal militias and remnants of Saddam’s army destabilize the new Iraqi state, including by attacking U.S. occupation forces.

This trifecta of former members of Saddam’s military, Iraqi Sunni fighters, and foreign jihadis would eventually give rise to the political/military/religious phenomenon now known as the Islamic State.  In the meantime, GCC anxiety over the erosion of a regional order based on pro-U.S. Sunni autocracies grew more acute as, from 2011, demands mounted in overwhelmingly Sunni Arab societies for expanded political participation and protection from—not collusion with—a U.S. “war on terror” that has killed hundreds of thousands of Sunni Muslims.  In this context, the “threat” to the GCC from today’s Iran is not that it is “Persian” or Shi’a, but that it is simultaneously Islamic and republican—that it seeks to integrate principles and institutions of Islamic governance with participatory politics and elections while maintaining a strong commitment to foreign policy independence.

Paving the way for jihadis

GCC leaders are relatively unconcerned about reform calls from secular liberals, judging (rightly) that this agenda elicits limited support in Arab societies.  But they worry deeply about Sunni movements, like the Muslim Brotherhood, willing to compete for power in elections.  For GCC rulers, these groups are profoundly threatening, for if Muslim-majority Arab publics can elect Islamic governments, the historically most potent argument for monarchy in Arabia—that it is essential to propagating true Islam—goes out the window.  To forestall this, Riyadh and its partners have declared the Brothers “terrorists” in GCC jurisdictions, and have worked to quash them around the region—as with Saudi and Emirati backing for the July 2013 coup against Egypt’s elected Brotherhood government.

By undermining the Brothers as a vehicle for expanding Sunni political engagement, Saudi Arabia and its allies leave jihadi groups like al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State as the only options for Sunni Arabs dissatisfied with the status quo.  They make things worse by building up violent jihadis as alternatives to the Brothers—in Libya, Syria, and, now, Yemen—with Washington’s collaboration, and with disastrous humanitarian and political consequences.

What has unfolded in Libya since 2011—the state’s destruction, civil war, a U.S. ambassador’s murder, and incubation of a major jihadi hub that had not existed before—is hardly due to Iranian perfidy.  It is the result of a military campaign, led by America and Saudi Arabia, to bring down the Qadhafi government—and, in the process, show that it wasn’t only pro-Western autocrats who were vulnerable to overthrow.  Many of this campaign’s devastating effects flow from Riyadh’s use of the Libya war to revive jihadi cadres worn down by years of fighting U.S. forces in Iraq—cadres the Saudis then deployed in Syria.

Saudi intervention ensured that jihadis—many non-Syrian—would dominate Syrian opposition ranks, undercutting any potential role for the Brotherhood in leading anti-Assad forces.  It also turned what began in Syria as indigenously generated protests over particular grievances into a heavily militarized (and illegal) campaign against the recognized government of a UN member state—but with a popular base too small either to bring down that government or to negotiate a settlement with it.  It is Saudi policy—not Iran’s support for Syria’s government against an externally-fueled insurgency that, as Syrian oppositionists themselves admitcouldn’t defeat him at the ballot box—that is responsible for Syria’s agony.

Cost of reckless strategy

The most glaringly negative consequence of Riyadh’s posture toward both post-Saddam Iraq and the Arab Awakening has been the Islamic State’s explosive ascendance, marked by impressive territorial gains in both Iraq and Syria.  The Islamic State’s proclamation of a religiously legitimate caliphate represents a much bigger problem for Saudi Arabia than for the United States.  Yet, while Riyadh has ostensibly joined Washington’s anti-Islamic State “coalition,” it is doubling down on its jihadi proxy strategy.  After using the al-Qa’ida-affiliated Jabhat an-Nusra to destroy non-jihadi opposition forces in Syria, Riyadh has persuaded Qatar and Turkey—previously the Syrian Brotherhood’s biggest backers— to help it promote a new, Jabhat an-Nusra-led jihadi alliance that recently captured a major Syrian city.  In Yemen, Saudi airstrikes have helped al-Qa’ida make territorial gains—and to eclipse even further the Brotherhood’s Yemeni affiliates.

Saudi Arabia pursues these policies—however risky (even reckless) they seem to outsiders—because decision-makers in Riyadh judge that they maximize the ruling family’s chances of holding onto power.  The United States, for its part, should continue cooperating with Saudi Arabia where U.S. and Saudi interests overlap.  But U.S. interests also require that Washington undertake strategically-grounded diplomacy with all major regional players—including, above all, a rising Iran.  And Washington certainly should be able to confront the Saudis and others in the GCC when they pursue policies contrary to U.S. interests.  Like too many of his predecessors, Obama has yet to learn how to do this.

–Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett

 

Saudi Arabia’s “Great Game” in Yemen and America’s Deluded Response: Hillary Mann Leverett on CCTV’s The Heat

Hillary underscored the witlessly reflexive character of U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen this week on CCTV’s The Heat, see here and (for YouTube) here.  Critiquing the ongoing Saudi military campaign in Yemen, Hillary points out that “no one in Washington is sure what the goal is, what the Saudis are trying to achieve.  It is certainly destabilizing, empowering of al-Qa’ida, and further inflaming the tensions throughout the region.”

Given simultaneous uncertainty about Saudi goals and clear evidence of downside consequences for U.S. interests, why have American policymakers let their country get sucked into supporting such an ill-conceived enterprise?  As Hillary explains, U.S. backing for the Kingdom’s latest escapade against its southern neighbor has virtually nothing to do with Washington’s concerns about on-the-ground developments in Yemen.  Rather, U.S. backing for Riyadh’s war in Yemen has virtually everything to do with America’s longstanding but increasingly dysfunctional strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia:

“Saudi Arabia is the linchpin, is the pillar of American policy in the Middle East, is the way the U.S. exercises its hegemony in the Middle East.  Without Saudi Arabia, we don’t have that kind of policy.  For the Saudis, Yemen is incredibly important, and that’s why we support this Saudi campaign in Yemen, even though it is squarely against U.S. interests, especially in terms of how it’s empowering al-Qa’ida—and even ISIS, the Islamic State—in Yemen and elsewhere.”

Hillary also discusses Iran’s real role in Yemen—it’s not what conventional narratives in Washington and Western mainstream media would have you believe—and the prospects for a political settlement In Yemen based on “devolved power.”

Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett