Suppressing Reality-Based Analysis: Chomsky, the Leveretts, and America’s Iran Debate

Mainstream reaction to our new book, Going to Tehran:  Why the United States Must Come to Terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran, underscores some important realities about America’s Iran debate—and about the political and cultural obstacles to truly constructive change in American foreign policy.  Flynt addressed this point last week on “The Monitor,” a news analysis program hosted by Mark Bebawi and Otis McClay for KPFT, Pacifica Radio’s Houston station.  (To listen to the interview, click here; Flynt is the second half of the program, so those who want to go directly to him should scroll forward to just slightly past the halfway mark.)

In his first question, Mark Bebawi underscores that both of us are people who have spent “a lot of time in the institutions of power,” with connections to “all sorts of fairly well respected within the mainstream” organizations (e.g., the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and, at various points, prominent Washington think tanks).  He commends Going to Tehran as “full of logical thinking based on history.”  He notes, though, that because the book’s analyses and arguments are “going against the tide,” mainstream reaction to Going to Tehran is “full of all sorts of accusations about what your motives might be” for having written itincluding “everything from accusations of being agents of the Iranian government to being a disgruntled employee.”  Flynt responds,

We are taking on a very well entrenched mythology about Iran—about its foreign policy, about its internal politics, about how the United States deals with it.  Particularly in the post-Cold War era, America has embraced some very, very dangerous mythologies about different parts of the world, about America’s role in the world—I think that’s an important part of how we got into the terrible blunder and crime of the Iraq War.

My wife and I watched that one from the inside, when all the institutions that Americans are supposed to rely on to push back against bad policy ideas, against bad analysis, against bad arguments—institutions like Congress, media, think tanks, public intellectuals—with a few honorable and courageous exceptions, those institutions basically rolled over for the executive branch.  And we were determined that, this time around, someone was going to ask the hard questions, make the kind of countervailing arguments that should have been made before the Iraq invasion, but weren’t.

But if you’re going to take that task on, you’re going to be confronting, as I said, a lot of well entrenched myths, with some very powerful constituencies and groups and interests that are identified with those myths.  And they will come at you with everything they’ve got.

The interview goes on to consider whether American policy toward Iran has changed very much during Barack Obama’s presidency, to dissect some of the specific myths that distort America’s Iran debate (on Israel, nuclear weapons, and terrorism), and to explore why America’s Iran policy continues on such a dysfunctional course.  We, however, want to focus on Mark’s initial question on mainstream reaction to Going to Tehran and what it says about the obstacles to really serious debate over American foreign policy.

In this context, we also want to highlight a brilliant piece by Glenn Greenwald in The Guardian last month, “How Noam Chomsky Is Discussed,” see here.  Glenn argues that “one very common tactic for enforcing political orthodoxies is to malign the character, ‘style’ and even mental health of those who challenge them…as a means of impugning, really avoiding, the substance of the critique.”  As Glenn lays out in compelling detail, “Nobody has been subjected to these vapid discrediting techniques more than Noam Chomsky.”

To illustrate his thesis about mainstream media treatment of dissident voices, Glenn dissects The Guardian’s own reporting on Prof. Chomsky’s recent Edward W. Said Lecture in London; the address, “Violence and Dignity—Reflections on the Middle East,” focuses to a considerable degree on Iran as a target of U.S. and Western efforts to dominate the region.  Glenn aptly describes The Guardian’s reporting on the speech as

“infused with these standard personality caricatures that offer the reader an easy means of mocking, deriding and scorning Chomsky without having to confront a single fact he presents.  And that’s the point…[for Chomsky] rationally but aggressively debunks destructive mainstream falsehoods that huge numbers of people are taught to tacitly embrace.  But all of that can be, and is, ignored in favor of hating his ‘style,’ ridiculing his personality, and smearing him with horrible slurs (‘self-hating Jew’).”

Though Glenn does not include it in this litany, Chomsky has also periodically been pilloried as an “apologist” for various resistance movements and non-Western leaders who displease the United States.  Glenn goes on to comment,

“What’s particularly strange about this set of personality and style attacks is what little relationship they bear to reality.  Far from being some sort of brutal, domineering, and angry ‘alpha-male’ savage, Chomsky—no matter your views of him—is one of the most soft-spoken and unfailingly civil and polite political advocates on the planet.  It’s true that his critiques of those who wield power and influence can be withering—that’s the central function of an effective critic or just a human being with a conscience—but one would be hard-pressed to find someone as prominent as he who is as steadfastly polite and considerate and eager to listen when it comes to interacting with those who are powerless and voiceless…

What is at play here is this destructive dynamic that the more one dissents from political orthodoxies, the more personalized, style-focused and substance-free the attacks become.  That’s because once someone becomes sufficiently critical of establishment pieties, the goal is not merely to dispute their claims but to silence them.  That’s accomplished by demonizing the person on personality and style grounds to the point where huge numbers of people decide that nothing they say should even be considered, let alone accepted.”

By referencing Glenn’s article here, we do not mean to compare ourselves to Noam Chomsky—among other reasons, whatever abuse we have suffered from our critics hardly comes close to the accumulated ad hominem vituperation directed at Prof. Chomsky for decades.  But we want to make the analytically crucial point that  much of the critical reaction to Going to Tehran and our other work on Iran and U.S.-Iranian relations—including attacks on our character, our motivations, our personalities, our “style”—is, in important respects, reminiscent of the assaults launched against Prof. Chomsky over the years.  And such attacks are directed against us for much the same reason that they have been directed against Chomsky—as Glenn puts it so well, to enable “the substance of [our] critique to be avoided in lieu of alleged personality flaws.

Consider just a few examples of mainstream media treatment of us and our book:

–Expatriate Iran “experts” whose own analytic records are marked by serial misreadings of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy and internal politics are given platforms in mainstream outlets like The New Republic, Survival (the journal of the International Institute for Strategic Studies), and the Wall Street Journal—not to take on, in any intellectually serious way, our historically documented, thoroughly referenced assessments of these matters, but to dismiss us as “morally deformed” and “apologists” for evil.  (Anti-Islamic Republic Iranian expatriates aren’t the only ones to label us as “apologists.”  No less than Dennis Ross describes us this way—and, to be fair, what American knows more about explaining away another country’s crimes than Dennis Ross—as has The New Republic in its own editorials.)

–Because Hillary is Jewish, interned at AIPAC as a young student, worked at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy early in her career, but has clearly moved far beyond the pro-Israel mantras that warp America’s Middle East debate, Jeffrey Goldberg opined in The Atlantic that she has “lost her bearings.”  Not content to go after us with unfounded assertions about our mental health, pro-Israel publications and Iranian expatriate opponents of the Islamic Republic also claim that we are somehow cashing in by arguing for a fundamentally different U.S. strategy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran (another lie that has been given wider circulation by Jeffrey Goldberg).

–The New York Times assigned its “review” of our book to one of the leading journalistic cheerleaders for the Green movement which, after Iran’s 2009 presidential election, was romanticized by Western pundits as a mass popular uprising poised to sweep away the Islamic Republic, perhaps within a few months.  The mainstream commentariat has never forgiven us for our utterly accurate appraisal of the Greens’ weaknesses and our spot-on assessment that, even at its height, the movement never represented anything close to a majority of Iranians living in their country.  The Times review would have readers think that, by being right when everyone else (including the reviewer) were spectacularly wrong, we are morally dubious “partisans” whose analyses shouldn’t be taken seriously.

Those specimens all come from our declared intellectual and political enemies.  One of the more remarkable aspects of critical reaction to Going to Tehran is how even some commentators who profess openness to the basic idea of “engaging” Iran want to read us out of proper policy debate because we refuse to endorse conventional but ill-informed and un-nuanced criticisms of human rights conditions in the Islamic Republic.  So, for example, the National Journal’s Michael Hirsh writes,

“Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, husband-and-wife renegade former officials in the George W. Bush administration, have an idea.  President Obama should execute a Nixon-in-China approach with Tehran:  Leap 180 degrees from a policy of isolation to all-out engagement…Maybe they have a point, but the Leveretts don’t stop there.  They say accommodation is imperative because Tehran is gaining strength (despite the imminent loss of its only ally, Syria’s besieged Bashar al-Assad); the legitimacy of the regime is unquestioned (the once-powerful ‘Green’ democracy movement was always marginal, they say); and Washington has no choice but to embrace the mullahs.  Besides, are the mullahs really so much worse than we are?  ‘The U.S. government simply has no credibility to address human-rights issues in Iran,’ Flynt Leverett said.  It seemed a bit much.”

“It seemed a bit much.”  Notwithstanding pages of analysis of Iran’s regional position and strategy, notwithstanding the reality that Assad’s government isn’t going anywhere anytime soon, notwithstanding a whole chapter with reams of actual data on the 2009 election and the Greens’ brief rise and rapid fall—all that is dismissed with five words:  “It seemed a bit much.”  Likewise, the sad reality that the United States, as a matter of policy, is only interested in the selective, instrumental leveraging of human rights concerns to undermine governments it doesn’t like has been very clearly documented.  Washington has co-opted—and corrupted—the human rights agenda; that’s why it has no credibility to address human rights in Iran.  Those who believe that, as long as America is running a dirty war against the Islamic Republic (including economic warfare, cyber-attacks, and support for groups doing things inside Iran that, most other places in the world, Washington would condemn as “terrorism”), it can credibly champion human rights there are deluded.  But this, too, seemed a bit much for Hirsh.

To further discredit us, Hirsh compares us and our book—and he doesn’t mean it as a compliment—to John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, and their The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy.  Like Chomsky, Mearsheimer and Walt have by-now considerable experience with people attacking their characters, motives, and personalities rather than dealing with the arguments they raise in their book, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy.  For the record, while we disagree with a few specific points in their book, we admire its authors tremendously not just for their courage, but also for the bounty of important insights their book offers.  We are proud and humbled to be compared with them; we hope that Going to Tehran might contribute as much as their book to opening up additional intellectual space for serious discussion of what’s wrong with America’s Middle East policy.

We should perhaps credit Hirsh with using more than five words to dismiss us.  He also describes how, a few days after hearing us talk about Going to Tehran, he saw the debut of Maziar Bahari’s new movie, Forced Confessions—which, according to Hirsh, “describes how secret police have turned Iran into a brutal world of Kafkaesque detentions and tortured confessions.  Bahari was put on public display in 2009 and forced to state that foreign agents incited the Green movement—evidence the regime was actually terrified of the uprising.”  But the most damning part?  “Flynt and Hillary did not attend the screening.”

That’s right—probably because we’re too busy trying to keep our country from starting another strategically and morally calamitous war to indulge an expatriate Iranian-Canadian dissident with a burning desire that the Islamic Republic fall and Iran become a secular liberal state, even if that’s not what most Iranians living inside their country want.  More broadly, Hirsh’s rejection of our argument for strategically-grounded engagement with the Islamic Republic (an argument for which he professes sympathy) because we won’t pay obeisance to Washington norms requiring those advocating better relations with Iran to modulate their advocacy with periodic expressions of disgust with human rights conditions there highlights a powerful barrier to a more rational Iran debate.  For Hirsh is not alone.  We’ve had any number of people—including some for whom we have great respect and even affection—privately counsel us, before Going to Tehran was published and after, to moderate our “tone.”  For some, this meant fewer references to “the Islamic Republic” and more to “Iran.”  For others it meant regular acknowledgement, even if only in passing, of various “deplorable acts” by Iran’s government.

We have declined to follow such advice, regardless of how well-intended we knew it to be from some of its sources.  We haven’t followed it because doing so would mean buying into and advancing a narrative crafted (whether everyone espousing it realizes or not) to delegitimize the Islamic Republic of Iran and, ultimately, to take America to war against it—a point that Chomsky, in his own way, has also made.  Overwhelmingly, the available evidence indicates that the majority of Iranians in Iran support the basic model of the Islamic Republic, which has delivered vastly better lives for most Iranians than was possible at the time of the Iranian Revolution.  A significant number of Iranians may want the Islamic Republic to evolve in important ways—but they don’t want to get rid of it entirely.  To suggest otherwise is both intellectually and morally irresponsible.

Those who believe they can indulge self-gratifying criticisms of human rights conditions in Iran while continuing to insist that they are opposed to American military aggression against the Islamic Republic are, in some ways even more dangerously deluded.  You can’t have it both ways.  For in the narratives Americans construct to justify their wars, the United States does not go to war to defend its interests; it does so to liberate othersUntil those trying to have it both ways understand that they can’t, too many of those who claim to oppose a U.S.-initiated war against Iran will, with their facile criticisms of “human rights” there, be making such a war more likely.

Similarly, those who think Washington can somehow “engage” Tehran but make human rights and secular democratization a core part of the diplomatic dialogue are also dangerously deluded.  For what political order—especially one focused on restoring and protecting its country’s independence and effective sovereignty after decades of Western domination—would agree to negotiate its internal political transformation with the leading Western powerTo avoid war, the United States will have to pursue rapprochement with the Islamic Republic as it is, not as some wish it to be.  And this means accepting the Islamic Republic as, for most Iranians, a legitimate (even if flawed) state.

In closing, we are very pleased to note that we will be taking part in an event, “Iran and American Foreign Policy:  Where the US Went Wrong,” with Noam Chomsky at MIT next month, sponsored by MIT’s Technology and Culture Forum.  We are excited at the prospect and grateful to Professor Chomsky.  We hope that this event will contribute to expanding the range of “acceptable” debate about Iran in American political discourse.

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

 

What’s Wrong with Washington’s Iran Debate (2)—The Leveretts Respond to Ray Takeyh on Going to Tehran

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In its February-March 2013 issue, Survival (the journal of the International Institute of Strategic Studies) published a “review” of our book, Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran, by Ray Takeyh.  Because of subscription limitation, we cannot post the review in its entirety.  In February, however, we posted some excerpts—as well as a scintillating essay by Nima Shirazi responding to Takeyh.  Now, Survival has published our response to Takeyh in its April-May issue.  We append it below:

Objectivity and the Iran Debate

Sir,

After reading Ray Takeyh’s review of our Going to Tehran:  Why the United States Must Come to Terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran (Survival, February-March 2013, pp. 178-181), we are compelled to note that it is unethical for a reviewer (and his publisher) not to acknowledge circumstances which raise questions about the reviewer’s objectivity in assessing a particular book.  Such might be the case if a book under review severely criticized the reviewer’s own work.

One of our major themes in Going to Tehran is that America’s Iran debate is dominated by foreign policy pundits and Iran “experts” with, in most cases, no direct connection to on-the-ground reality inside Iran; many of these “experts” are Iranian expatriates or Iranian-Americans whose families fled the Iranian Revolution and want to see the Islamic Republic fail.  We lay out, in thoroughly referenced detail, the misleading analyses of Iranian politics and foreign policy that such people have produced.  These include analyses by Takeyh himself—something which Takeyh never mentions, much less addresses, as he smears us as “apologists” for “the mullahs” in Tehran.

In our book, we document the long record of howlingly wrong assessments and projections that Takeyh has produced—from his data- and fact-free assertions that Iran’s 2009 presidential election was fraudulent to his insistence that the Islamic Republic is too dependent on anti-Americanism to improve relations with Washington (an insistence that ignores a 25-year accumulation of statements from the highest-level Iranian authorities and an equally long and documented record of efforts by Iranian leaders to respond positively to American requests for cooperation and to proffer their own overtures).  Put more bluntly, Going to Tehran makes a substantial case that Takeyh is professionally incompetent; given this, how could anyone consider him an objective reviewer of our book?

If Survival wants to stage a debate between the Leveretts and Takeyh, this could, in principle, be structured in an intellectually responsible fashion.  But it is intellectually irresponsible—indeed, deeply deceptive—that, in an ostensibly objective review of our book, neither Takeyh nor Survival’s editors informed readers of critical facts that would almost certainly affect those readers’ assessments of Takeyh’s objectivity.  (For Takeyh then to accuse us of “moral confusion” is especially ironic.)

Besides critiquing the analytic record of a cadre of Western Iran “experts” disproportionately populated by expatriates hostile to the Islamic Republic, Going to Tehran holds that, until Americans stop listening to such people, Washington will continue pursuing dangerously dysfunctional policies toward Iran and losing ground in the Middle East.  For decades—from the Bay of Pigs to the even more strategically counter-productive invasion of Iraq—American elites have embraced expatriate native authenticators willing to provide intellectual validation for regime change campaigns (declared and undeclared) against governments that challenge U.S. foreign policy preferences.

In the run-up to the Iraq invasion, America’s Iraq debate was dominated by Iraqi and other Arab expatriate activists and commentators—from defectors with code names like Curveball and political entrepreneurs like Ahmad Chalabi to seemingly more respectable “public intellectuals” like Kanan Makiya and Fouad Ajami.  American elites saw these expatriates as lending an indigenous authenticity to the case for coercive regime change in Iraq.  Those who dared to challenge that case were smeared as “apologists” for an evil dictator.  But the assessments offered by these expatriates—about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, the character of post-Saddam Iraqi politics, and the impact of Saddam’s overthrow on the regional balance of power and regional attitudes about the United States—were profoundly wrong.  As a result, the United States is in a much weaker position in the Middle East.

One reason we wrote Going to Tehran was our belief that, if Washington launches another illegal war in the Middle East, to disarm yet another country of weapons of mass destruction it does not have, the “blowback” to America’s strategic standing will make the damage done by the Iraq war look almost trivial in comparison.  If we once again allow decision-making regarding another critical state, about which Western leaders know next to nothing, to be shaped by agenda-driven analyses like that produced by Takeyh and others whose work we critique, disaster will be the result.

Given all that is at stake, Survival owes its readers open intellectually honest discussion of Iran-related issues.  Takeyh’s review of our book abjectly fails to meet that standard.

Flynt Leverett

Hillary Mann Leverett

McLean, VA

We should note that, in the same issue of Survival in which our letter is published, Takeyh offers a two-sentence reply to it:  “I stand by every word of my review.  Going to Tehran is a morally deformed book.”

The first responsibility of a political analyst—morally as well as intellectually—is to get the analysis right.  What is “morally deformed” is to continue getting analyses of Iran’s foreign policy and internal politics wrong—episode after episode, year after year, manufactured crisis after manufactured crisis—because of one’s personal sense that Iran is supposed to be a secular liberal state (regardless of what the Iranian people want) and/or that the United States should be able to act as a hegemonic power in the Middle East.  On that count, Takeyh and too many other Iran “experts” in the United States have much for which to answer.

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

 

America’s “Imperial Temptation” in the Middle East—and the Looming Hangover from Obama’s Intoxicating Rhetoric

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Our latest article, published by Al Jazeera and Huffington Post, argues that “those intoxicated by Obama’s rhetoric” during his recent trip to Israel “will soon experience a painful hangover.  For…Obama’s Middle East strategy is marked by a growing discrepancy between the arrogance of America’s regional agenda and its declining capacity to realize this agenda.”  We spell this out with regard to the Palestinian issue and the Syrian conflict—and explain how America’s determination to act as an imperial power in the region and its animus against the Islamic Republic of Iran has warped its Middle East policy.

We encourage you to go online at either or both Al Jazeera and Huffington Post to leave comments, Facebook likes, etc.  We also append our piece below:

Following President Obama’s address to an audience of Israeli students in Jerusalem last week, progressive commentators in the United States hailed the speech as “a passionate appeal for peace” that “placed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict squarely back on his agenda.”  But those intoxicated by Obama’s rhetoric will soon experience a painful hangover.  For the President’s Israel speech and the rest of his Middle East trip were focused, first and foremost, on domestic politics here in the United States.  And Obama’s Middle East strategy is marked by a growing discrepancy between the arrogance of America’s regional agenda and its declining capacity to realize this agenda.

Understanding the tragedy of Obama’s Middle East policy requires some historical perspective.  Two decades ago, America came out of the Cold War and the first Persian Gulf War with a degree of strategic supremacy like the world had not seen for centuries.  This supremacy seemed especially pronounced in the Middle East.  Since then, though, America has not been content to maintain its primacy in the Middle East, defend its interests there, and deal effectively with the region’s complex political and security dynamics.  Instead, it has succumbed to a post-Cold War temptation to act as an imperial power in the Middle East, trying to coerce political outcomes with the goal of consolidating a pro-American regional order.

The United States did this by retaining military forces on the ground in Saudi Arabia and other Arab states after the first Gulf War—something it did not do, to any significant extent, during the Cold War.  It did this by leveling sanctions against Saddam Husayn’s regime that led to the deaths of more than a million Iraqis, including half a million children.  It did this after 9/11 by invading Afghanistan and Iraq and pursuing prolonged occupations that have killed hundreds of thousands of civilians.  It is doing this today with escalating sanctions, covert operations, and cyber-attacks against Iran.  Linked to all of these policies is Washington’s perpetual insistence that everyone in the region not just accept Israel but tolerate virtually any definition of its security requirements and territorial needs put forward by the Israeli government.

This imperial turn has proven not just quixotic but deeply damaging to American standing, in the Middle East and globally.  As a presidential candidate in 2008, Barack Obama seemed to understand this when he pledged not just to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq but to end what he called the “mindset” that led America into the strategic mistake of invading Iraq in the first place.  But, as president, Obama has pursued the same kinds of policies as his predecessors, extending the damage they did to America’s strategic position.

Among other self-damaging policies, Obama has, like his predecessors, bought into the proposition that an Israel with nearly absolute freedom of military initiative bolsters U.S. supremacy in the Middle East, by helping to subordinate regional players aspiring to some measure of strategic independence.  Consequently, he is presiding not just over a stalled Middle East peace process, but over the very demise of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In this context, Obama’s primary mission in Israel was making peace not between Israelis and Palestinians but with the Israel lobby and Congress, to boost his chances of passing a domestic agenda before congressional elections in 2014.  While the Israel lobby does not take positions on domestic issues, it nonetheless has real impact on a president’s ability to get domestic initiatives through Congress—for congressmen are less willing to take politically difficult votes, even for a president of their own party, if that president’s foreign policies generate friction with the lobby.

In Jerusalem, Obama was out to persuade “pro-peace” constituencies in his electoral coalition that he has not abandoned the project of Israeli-Palestinian peace—but without offering the substantive definitions of the requirements for a viable two-state solution that so offend the Israel lobby.  He made only the most passing reference to prior statements about 1967 borders as an essential baseline for negotiating a territorial settlement, or to halting Israeli settlements as essential to progress.

More tellingly, Obama’s admonitions that only direct negotiations with Israel can produce peace and that Palestinians must not try the “short cut” of seeking further UN recognition for a Palestinian state are clear signals that realizing Palestinian rights is not his priority.  Two decades of direct talks between Israel and Palestinians have produced neither peace nor a Palestinian state.  While Israel continues vaguely professing interest in peace—and Obama insists the Palestinian Authority help police Israel’s ongoing occupation of the West Bank—for most Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims there is no moral case for peace (much less Israeli security) when Palestinian rights remain subjugated.

If Obama were serious about Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, he would have the United States sponsor Palestinian membership in the United Nations, not veto it—so that the International Criminal Court could hear Palestinian claims about occupation and Israeli human rights violations.  But Obama won’t do that—even though U.S. support for Israel’s occupation of Arab populations and military aggression grows ever more damaging to America’s standing as regional publics become more mobilized—because he is on board with the established strategy.  And so he promotes a peace process—not actual peace, just a process—designed to protect Israel’s capacity to dominate its neighbors militarily.

Obama’s support for Syrian oppositionists reflects the same sort of hubristic thinking.  His administration started backing opposition elements in 2011, not to help Syrians but to weaken Iran’s regional position and perhaps even spark the Islamic Republic’s overthrow.  This proved unrealistic, for Assad’s government even today represents sizable constituencies.  As time passed and Assad didn’t fall, concern that jihadi extremists gaining ever greater prominence in opposition ranks would target U.S. interests (as happened in Libya) prompted the administration to temper its stance in advance of the 2012 U.S. presidential election.  Now it is returning to the imperial game, disregarding risks to both U.S. security interests and regional stability.  That’s why, in contrast to his charade on the Palestinian issue, Obama put real effort during his Middle East trip into brokering a renewal of Israeli-Turkish relations—for, in Washington’s view, Israeli-Turkish cooperation could facilitate a renewed push for Assad’s removal.

Just three days after Obama’s Jerusalem speech, Secretary of State John Kerry told reporters in Baghdad, with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki beside him, that Kerry’s predecessor, Hillary Clinton, assured him Maliki “is going to do whatever I say.”  (Maliki immediately replied, “We won’t do it.”)  Though fobbed off as a “joke,” Kerry’s talking points for what he later described as “spirited” private talks with Maliki reflected a conviction that Washington can in fact leverage Baghdad’s compliance with U.S. demands on Syria.  Kerry told Maliki that barring Syria-bound Iranian aircraft from Iraqi airspace is a condition for Iraq’s inclusion in discussions of Syria’s post-Assad future.  Kerry also warned that failing to cooperate in ending the Syrian conflict on Washington’s preferred lines—through Assad’s removal—raises the danger that fighting will “spillover” and destabilize Iraq.

This ignores that Maliki’s interests are profoundly threatened by Assad’s prospective displacement by U.S./Saudi/Turkish-backed opposition forces.  (That’s why Maliki said that, while wanting good relations with Saudi Arabia, he will conclude a formal alliance with Iran if Assad falls.)  The most likely result of rebel “success” is not the Assad government’s replacement by a coherent, nationwide alternative.  It’s Syria’s devolution into warring fiefdoms, with forces loyal to what’s left of the government battling increasingly fractious opposition militias that fight each other as much as they fight the Assad camp.  Under these circumstances, Washington has no plausible claim it can stop extremist jihadis now fighting in Syria from taking their campaign for a new salafi ascendancy into Iraq.

Maliki has a clear interest in seeing the Syrian conflict stop.  But the only credible way this can happen is if America and others backing Syrian rebels get behind a new political compact for Syria, based on power-sharing between government and opposition.  Until then, Iraq’s interests—like those of Iran, Russia, and China—lie in thwarting efforts by Washington and its partners to remake the regional balance by targeting the Assad government.  That’s a recipe for prolonged carnage, in Syria and perhaps elsewhere, that smarter—and less imperial—U.S. policy could avert.

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett